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chapter 3




Gellner explains nationalism as a political principle “which holds that the po-
litical and national unit should be congruent”.2 Similarly, Hobsbawm regards 
the nation as a social entity to the extent that it has its own state.3 These au-
thors treat ‘nationalism’ and ‘having a state proper to the nation’ as insepa-
rable. As a result, when these thoughts are applied to the reality of sub-state 
nations (henceforth ssn), as in the cases of Flanders, Catalonia Basque Coun-
try and Québec, sub-state nationalism and separatism seem to be conceptu-
ally entangled in their aim for an independent state. In light of the contem-
porary reality of federal states that are composed of several different ssns, 
however, this picture is misleading. In the case of ‘holding together federations’ 
(i.e. states that were originally unitary and subsequently became federal states 
by devolving some of their competences), sub-state nationalists have been sat-
isfied to have their claims for cultural protection organized at a lower level.4 In 
1 This research is supported by the National Center of Competence in Research – The Migra-
tion Mobility Nexus (nccr-On the move), funded by the Swiss National Foundation for Sci-
entific Research. Earlier versions of the chapter have benefited from the debates taking place 
during the 2015 Spring Semester at the ku Leuven Institute of Philosophy, within the frame-
work of the Justice Seminar; at the University of Geneva Department of Political Science and 
International Relations during the MultiCite Seminar; and at the ecpr General Conference 
2015 panel on ‘Linguistic Justice in Multinational Federations’. The author is grateful to all 
of the participants at these events, and specifically to Matteo Gianni, Helder De Schutter, 
François Hudon, Daniel Cetrà, Andrew Shorten, Annabelle Lever and Sergi Morales Gálvez. 
Gratitude is also due to the editors of the current volume, Roberta Medda-Windischer and 
Patricia Popelier, for their comments and feedback, which have strengthened the quality of 
the text.
2 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983), at 1.
3 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), at 9.
4 For the distinction between holding together and coming together federations see: J. Bu-
chanan, “Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform”, 
(1995) 25(2) Publius.
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contrast, sub-state separatism aims to transform the ssn into an independent 
state. In other words, it is possible to be a sub-state nationalist without being 
a sub-state separatist, although the reverse is not possible. In short, sub-state 
separatists are sub-state nationalists with a demand for an independent state.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the relationship between sub-
state separatist political parties and immigration policies.5 Given that the 
integration policies of ssns are often devolved, while immigration policies 
(e.g. with regard to admission and removal) are situated at the federal level,6 
integration policies offer fertile ground for examining the nature of this rela-
tionship. Sub-state separatist movements appear to be particularly opposed to 
increasing immigration. For example, the leader of Parti Québécois, Pierre Karl 
Péladeau, blamed immigrants for damaging Québec’s sovereigntist cause dur-
ing a discussion concerning the need to organize a referendum on indepen-
dence: “With demographics, with immigration, it is clear that we are losing one 
riding7 [my emphasis] a year. […] We would like to be able to better control it, 
but we have no illusions. Who has responsibility for the immigrants that come 
to live here? It is the federal government. Of course we have shared responsi-
bility, but they are making their oath to the Queen.”8 Despite the fact that he 
apologized a day later, it is intriguing to consider the possibility of a general in-
compatibility between sub-state separatism and immigration. This chapter ex-
plores the tension between these two political factors in the case of Flanders, 
addressing the question of whether the Flemish separatist political parties – 
the Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest; henceforth, the VB) and the Nieuwe 
Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance; henceforth, the N-VA) – actually do 
favour restrictive (i.e. exclusionist) policies of immigration and integration.
Given that separatists are simultaneously sub-state nationalists, the litera-
ture on sub-state nationalism and its relationship to immigration is relevant to 
our purposes. There is a particular challenge in the literature on the legitimacy 
dilemma of sub-state nationalism. Establishing the nation-building policies 
5 S. Jeram, A. Van der Zwet and V. Wisthaler, “Friends or Foes? Migrants and Sub-state National-
ists in Europe”, (2015) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.
6 C. Joppke and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and London, 
Ithaca, 2012); E. Hepburn and R. Zapata-Barrero, The Politics of Immigration in Multilevel 
States: Governance and Political Parties (Houndmills and Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014).
7 A riding is an electoral district in Canada, known as ‘constituency’ in other countries.
8 A. Woods, “Immigrants to Quebec hurting sovereigntist cause, Pierre Karl Péladeau says”, 
Brampton Guardian, March 19, 2015, accessed May 20, 2015, available at http://www.bramp 
tonguardian.com/news-story/5515237-immigrants-to-quebec-hurting-sovereigntist-cause 
-pierre-karl-p-ladeau-says/.
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desired by the ssn requires democratic support from the citizens, and such 
support is more likely to occur when the dominant cultural identity is widely 
shared by the members.9 The legitimacy of the sub-state’s nation-building pol-
icies thus necessitates the exclusion of migrants. In turn, this exclusion risks 
discrediting the nation-building processes, as they could be perceived as il-
liberal.10 In other words, the internal dimension of legitimacy seems to require 
the exclusion of immigrants, whereas the external dimension requires their 
inclusion. It has been claimed that this exclusionary rationale is a result of the 
improbability of migrants to become sub-state nationalists or their inability to 
understand the historical struggle that gave way to a specific mentality of the 
sub-nation known as ‘la survivance’.11 The examination of two different Flem-
ish separatist parties also reveals how these parties have tended to develop 
towards favouring a post-ethnic understanding of citizenship and legitimizing 
the separatist cause.
The chapter combines a normative political theory approach with the con-
textual analysis of the Flemish case. The determination of whether a party 
standpoint is prone to inclusion or exclusion requires the availability of mor-
ally defensible definitions of several concepts (e.g. integration, assimilation) 
as normative reference points. These reference points, which are consistent 
with liberal democratic principles, make it possible to determine whether the 
vb and the N-VA are exclusionary towards immigrants. The first step in the 
analysis consists of developing an historical overview of the federalization pro-
cess in Belgium. The second step involves explaining the dilemma of sub-state 
nationalism and its influence on the separatist political parties. The third step 
addresses the normative limits of integration policies in the ssn, with the goal 
of distinguishing it from the assimilation of immigrants. I argue that integra-
tion differs from assimilation in that it respects the moral autonomy of im-
migrants. The fourth step concerns the standpoints of separatists with regard 
to immigration. The general argument of this chapter can be summarized as 
follows: although assimilationist policies imply pseudo-inclusion, they are ac-
tually exclusionary towards immigrants. By promoting assimilationist policies 
under the label of integration, therefore, the N-VA has an exclusionary attitude 
towards immigrants, even though it presents its position publicly as inclusive.
9 A.-G. Gagnon, and R. Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship, and Québec. Debating Multination-
alism (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2007); I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Poli-
cies of the Belgian Regions: Sub-state Nationalism and Policy Divergence after Devolu-
tion”, (2013) 23(5) Regional and Federal Studies, at 547–569.
10 W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).
11 W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, supra, at 277–278.
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 An Historical Overview of Belgian Federalization
Sub-state separatism differs from sub-state nationalism in that it is aimed at 
transforming the ssn into an independent state. Despite this difference, both 
of these groups agree on the federalization of the state. The disagreement aris-
es when this federalization is established. The claims for greater autonomy and 
full independence continue for separatism, but not necessarily for sub-state 
nationalism. In this section, I explain two notions in relation to an historical 
overview of the Belgian federalization process.
In holding-together federations, majority and minority forms of nationalism 
have historically competed to shape the state institutions according to their 
respective dominant identities, where one national minority has managed 
to establish a unitary state to the disadvantage of other groups.12 The Québe-
cois (in the case of Canada) and the Flemings (in the case of Belgium) found 
themselves on the disadvantaged side in the process. Before explaining Flem-
ish separatism, it is interesting to consider why the unitary state of Belgium 
is perceived as an obstacle, and how it served to motivate minority national-
ism. Three conditions can be identified as giving rise to minority nationalism: 
(1) cultural differences on the part of the sub-state community (e.g. language);13 
(2) economic disparities and related ideological differences between the mi-
norities; and (3) participatory disparities in shaping the state according to the 
needs of the first two differences.14
In the Belgian case, the historical domination of one minority by anoth-
er has proceeded parallel to socioeconomic differences between the regions 
where the different minorities are located. Even though the Belgian case is 
often described in terms of language nationalism led by the oppressed Flem-
ish minority, a complete account requires emphasizing both the cultural and 
12 The term national minority is used interchangeably with sub-state entity and federated 
entity. The usage does not include a demographic reference. For the Belgian case, the 
Flemish population constitutes the demographic majority.
13 D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); W. Kymlicka, Politics in 
the Vernacular, supra.
14 The current unitary structure of Turkey accommodating two communities shows some 
similarity to Belgium’s earlier stages. For instance, there is the pkk (Kurdish Labour Party), 
an allegedly terroristic organization based in Eastern Turkey (widely inhabited by Kurd-
ish people) which claims autonomy for the region and emphasizes cultural and linguistic 
differences. Despite these strictly cultural claims, there are wide economic disparities and 
disagreements between the Eastern and Western parts of the country: whereas Kurdish 
people tend to be more supportive of left-wing parties and decentralization, Western Tur-
key is marked by the support of right-wing parties and a unitary state.
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economic aspects. The argument in this regard is that (1) linguistic differences 
can become a driving force for change when accompanied by (2) ideological 
struggles for democratization and equality.15 In addition, minority nationalism 
can be distinguished from majority nationalism when (3) the participation of 
the minority is unfairly limited in terms of shaping the state. In this context, 
it could be argued that the primary aim of nationalist minority movements is 
to achieve inclusion in the nation-building policies of the state, focusing its 
attention on claims to autonomy only if such inclusion should fail. The transi-
tion in the objectives of the Flemish nationalists from demanding a ‘Bilingual 
Belgian state’ to demanding a ‘monolingual Flanders’ following the introduc-
tion of the language border in 1963 offers an interesting historical example in 
this regard. The former objective can be regarded as a demand for equal inclu-
sion and recognition, whereas the latter could be seen as a struggle for greater 
regional autonomy.16
In the case of sub-state separatism, however, claims to autonomy continue 
to favour increased devolution and, ultimately, the establishment of an inde-
pendent state. In some cases, the manner in which a country has been fed-
eralized can promote such results. One important institutional limitation ap-
pears when existing political parties are divided according to existing national 
communities. The presence of two socialist parties for each linguistic group in 
Belgium since the 1960s and 1970s is an example of this division. When devo-
lution takes such a shape, political parties have no institutional incentive to 
consider the interests of the non-voting linguistic group, nor do they have any 
incentive to foster common interests between the two groups. Related to this 
phenomenon, such settings increase the likelihood of success for the separat-
ist political parties. In order to remain competitive in attracting voters, other 
parties are also likely to be willing to incorporate a separatist agenda into their 
own party programmes.17
Deeper historical analysis of the entanglements of these two axes – linguistic/
cultural differences and economic disparities/ideological disagreements – 
could further clarify what motivates national minorities to struggle for auton-
omy. The relevant point in this regard, however, is that a common language 
and cultural identity can become emblematic, subsequently determining the 
choices of the minority nation, which continues to strive for greater autonomy. 
15 J. Blommaert, “The Long Language-Ideological Debate in Belgium”, (2011) (6)3 Journal of 
Multicultural Discourses.
16 J. Blommaert, “The Long Language-Ideological Debate in Belgium” supra, at 7.
17 In addition, the significant economic inequalities between Flanders and Wallonia have 
been identified as a driving force for the separatist cause.
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In other words, when the three aforementioned conditions are present, we can 
speak of a ‘critical juncture’, at which the choice to pursue greater autonomy 
will affect the subsequent course of history (i.e. by giving way to ‘path depen-
dency’). At some point, Flemings decided to claim greater autonomy and to 
federalize Belgium. In this sense, “[t]he selection made during the critical 
junction is consequential because it leads to the creation of institutional or 
structural patterns that endure over time.”18 In order to understand this path 
dependency, I provide a sketch of the federalization process in Belgium in rela-
tion to the demands of the ‘Flemish Movement’, with particular emphasis on 
the parallel character of the federalization process and the devolution of im-
migration policy.
Flemish nationalism is rooted in the foundation of the unitary/unilingual 
state of Belgium in 1830. At that time, Belgium harboured a Dutch-speaking 
population – which constituted a demographic majority – concentrated in 
the north, with a French-speaking population in the south, along with a small 
German-speaking population. Despite its deep historical roots, the economic, 
linguistic and cultural struggle that ultimately transformed the country into 
a federation was a slow process. The ‘Flemish Movement’ was formally orga-
nized with the foundation of the political party Volksunie (People’s Union; 
henceforth vu) in 1954. Until its dissolution in 2001, the vu constituted an 
umbrella institution hosting a diversity of ideological stances around a shared 
claim for ‘greater autonomy for Flanders’. For some time, this objective served 
as a driving and unifying force. As Flanders became more autonomous, how-
ever, the various claims increasingly generated conflicts, ultimately resulting 
in fragmentation into different political parties. The most important split in-
volved the defence of Flemish independence by the radical nationalists, under 
the leadership of Karel Dillen’s Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block; henceforth vb) in 
1978. Before its dissolution, the vu would once again witness ideological con-
flicts and split in two groups: the N-VA and Spirit,19 which constitute the con-
servative (N-VA) and progressive (Spirit) wings of the party. The N-VA quickly 
became the most important party in Flanders, with its remarkable election 
results in 2010. In contrast, the progressives allied with other existing political 
parties, including Groen! (the Green Party) and the Open vld (Liberal Party).
The brief history of the vu, as presented above, raises the question of why 
the political party came to an end. One possible answer is that it ended  simply 
18 J. Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central 
America (Baltimore, jhup, 2001), at 6.
19 Spirit is composed of Flemish social liberals. The party’s name is a Dutch abbreviation of: 
Social, Progressive, International, Regional, Integrally democratic and Future-oriented.
0002727378.INDD   91 4/20/2016   8:55:01 PM
Baycan92
301935
because its main objective had been achieved: with the establishment of 
a federal Belgium in 1993, Flanders became autonomous. Such an answer is 
consistent with the literature on the Belgian regionalist parties, which have 
been  described as “victims of their own success”.20 In other words, they disap-
peared as soon as their objectives had been obtained. After the language bor-
ders were established in 1963, the process of federalization began. It has proven 
to be a long process, usually involving significant steps through agreements 
between the Dutch and French-speaking communities within the framework 
of ‘ staatshervorming’ (state reform). Since 1970, there have been six state re-
forms, in which the various competences have been distributed amongst the 
various levels in the federation. Until 1970, Belgium had been a unitary state. 
The subsequent constitutional reforms in 1970, 1980 and 1988 led to the devolu-
tion of competences into the hands of the regions and communities. As a re-
sult, the 1993 constitutional reform clearly identified French-speaking, Dutch-
speaking and German-speaking communities as authoritative instances in 
relation to other non-territorial matters (e.g. the use of language and culture). 
The reform also established the three regions of Flanders, Wallonia and the 
Brussels- Capital, which are in charge of territorial matters (e.g. economy and 
infrastructure). In practice, the Flemish region and community share common 
institutions, with the francophone regional and community institutions re-
maining separate. The federal state, in turn, is in charge of matters of common 
importance to Belgian citizens, including justice, finance and social security, as 
well as the admission and expulsion of immigrants.
This process of federalization process has operated parallel to the devolu-
tion of migrant-integration policies. The labour-migration policy that came 
about through bilateral agreements with Southern European, Northern Afri-
can countries and Turkey was discontinued in 1974, when the official policy 
was transformed into one of ‘zero immigration’. The Special Law of 1980 trans-
ferred the competence of the ‘welcoming policy for migrant workers’21 to the 
Flemish and Walloon communities.22 This has been regarded as an ‘interest-
ing coincidence’,23 with regard to the successive onset of the federalization 
 process and the end of open immigration. It was at this point that the word 
20 K. Deschouwer, “The Rise and Fall of the Belgian Regionalist Parties”, (2009) 19(4–5) 
 Regional and Federal Studies, at 560.
21 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra, at 552.
22 In the Walloon region, the competences relating to immigrant-integration policy shifted 
in 1993 from the French Community to the Walloon region and the French Community 
Commission of the Brussels Capital Region.
23 M. Martiniello, “Immigrant Integration and Multiculturalism in Belgium” in R. Taras (ed.), 
Challenging Multiculturalism: European Models of Diversity (Edinburgh, Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, 2013), at 59.
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‘integration’ entered the picture. With this transfer of competence in 1980, “[…] 
the wording of the policy changed from ‘reception policy of migrant workers’ 
to ‘reception and integration [my emphasis] policy of migrants’”.24 At the end 
of the federalization process in Belgium, a general division of competences 
for migration-related matters was implemented across various levels. In gen-
eral, matters related to the admission and expulsion of migrants were retained 
as federal competences, while policies involving integration remained at the 
community level. The Flemish Community has been particularly unwilling to 
collaborate with either the French-speaking Community or the federal govern-
ment on this issue.
The federalization process did not end with the constitutional establish-
ment of different communities and regions in Belgium. Since then, there have 
been two state reforms, one in 2003 and another in 2012. Both of these reforms 
were challenging, and both resulted in protracted processes of governmen-
tal formation amongst the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking parties. The 
second process set a world record for the longest government-formation pro-
cess ever, with 541 days of political crisis. The two language groups engaged 
in various disagreements regarding public-debt resolution, deficit cuts and 
 socioeconomic reform, with sharp distinctions emerging between the two 
communities. The Flemish side sought to reduce state spending, while the 
French-speaking parties favoured raising taxes. The most contentious issue 
concerned the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (henceforth bhv). 
Before the state reform in 2012, the bhv had been the only electoral constitu-
ency that did not overlap with a Belgian province. Instead, Halle and Vilvoorde 
were part of the province of Flemish Brabant, while the rest of that province 
consisted of the arrondissement of Leuven, which formed its own electoral 
district. Earlier, in 2003, the Court of Arbitration (the current Belgian Constitu-
tional Court) ruled the bhv unconstitutional, given that Francophones living 
in the monolingual area surrounding Brussels were able to vote for the French-
speaking parties, while Dutch speakers living in the Walloon region could not 
vote for Dutch-speaking parties. The issue divided the two communities, given 
that the French-speaking parties were in favour of maintaining the status quo, 
whereas the Flemish-speaking parties favoured splitting the district in two, 
with Halle and Vilvoorde belonging to Flemish Brabant, and the Brussels Capi-
tal Region forming its own district.
Although the bhv question is clearly a complex issue, its various political 
and judicial dimensions exceed the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the 
bhv case does reveal the difficulty of forming a government at the federal level. 
This complexity, as symbolized by the bhv, was the primary motivation leading 
24 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra, at 552.
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the N-VA to defend Belgian confederalism. Although their notion of confeder-
alism is essentially vague, as it assumes some enhanced level of cooperation, 
the ultimate objective of the party programme is to establish an independent 
Flanders in Europe following the erosion of the Belgian state.25 During the 
2010 elections, immediately preceding the latest state reform in 2012, the Parti 
 Socialiste won in the southern part of the country, receiving 13.7% of the votes, 
with the N-VA receiving 17.4% of the overall votes in Belgium. The ideological 
differences between these two parties clearly reflect the divergent political cul-
tures of the Belgian communities, which preclude any satisfying compromises 
at the federal level. At this point, it is important to consider whether Belgium 
has any inherent structural limitations that may have resulted in such a part-
ing of the ways between these communities. Since the 1960s and 1970s, Belgian 
parties have been divided according to linguistic differences, and they receive 
votes from their respective language groups. The division of the political par-
ties according to linguistic communities provides them with incentives for pur-
suing community-specific interests, rather than interests common to both of 
the communities.26 Under these conditions, it is not surprising that a separatist 
party (e.g. the N-VA) has been gaining increasing influence while advancing the 
ideal of an independent Flanders. It successively achieved better election re-
sults, thereby becoming the strongest party in Flanders, having received 20.3% 
of the votes in the most recent elections. This division is not solely the result of 
the party system. It can also be attributed to the distinct public cultures of two 
communities. There is no common public debate for all Belgians. Instead, there 
are parallel Dutch-speaking and French-speaking media, each with its own 
distinct agenda. These political and public issues severely limit the common 
willingness to continue with the marriage of the two communities in Belgium.
 Sub-State Nationalism and Its Influence on the Separatist Parties
In this section, I consider whether the terms for immigration accommodation 
differ in ssns due to the normative dilemma of sub-state nationalism. The 
25 nva Election Programme, at 81, accessed 21 April, 2015, available at https://www.n-va 
.be/sites/default/files/generated/files/brochure-attachment/verkiezingsprogramma_n 
-va_2014.pdf.
26 K. Deschouwer, K. and P. Van Parijs, “Electoral Engineering for a Stalled Federation. 
A  Country-wide Electoral District for Belgium’s Federal Parliament” in B. O’Leary and 
J.  McEvoy (eds.), Power-Sharing in Deeply Divided Places (Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
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main primary argument is that this dilemma affects the new-generation sepa-
ratist party (the N-VA), which presents itself as inclusive of immigrants. In so 
doing, it is able to distinguish itself from the radical separatist party, the vb. In 
the following discussion, I start by explaining the moral dilemma of sub-state 
nationalism, after which I demonstrate its effect on the separatist parties.
The dilemma of sub-state nationalism is a dilemma of legitimacy in holding- 
together federations, in which the national minority seeks to introduce its own 
nation-building policies while receiving immigrants at the same time. Estab-
lishing these policies requires democratic support from the citizens, and such 
support is more likely to occur when the dominant cultural identity is widely 
shared by the members.27 As such, the legitimacy of the sub-state’s nation-
building policies depends upon the exclusion of migrants. Such exclusion, 
however, risks discrediting the nation-building processes insofar as they could 
be perceived as illiberal projects.28 In other words, the internal dimension of 
legitimacy seems to require the exclusion of immigrants, whereas the external 
dimension requires their inclusion.
Kymlicka’s solution for ‘saving’ ssns from favouring ethnicity-based citizen-
ship is for federal entities to devolve some immigrant-integration competen-
cies to the sub-state. This solution allows the ssn to exercise some control 
over education, culture and language, in addition to shifting the basis of their 
citizenship from ethnic to post-ethnic. Kymlicka nevertheless acknowledges 
that this solution does “[…] not offer any definitive answers […]”29 concern-
ing whether such control would comply with liberal norms. In the rest of this 
section, I consider the case of Flanders in relation to the dilemma of sub-state 
nationalism, in order to observe the dilemma’s explanatory power as applied 
to the Flemish case.
To resolve the dilemma of sub-state nationalism, Kymlicka recommends 
that the ssn should acquire competences in integration policies. The earlier 
section corroborated this view by demonstrating the parallel development of 
the federalization process and the devolution of integration policies in Bel-
gium. There are two cases in which the dilemma of sub-state nationalism can 
help to explain the developments in the Flemish case. The first involves the 
politicization of immigration by the radical-nationalist vb party in the 1980s. 
The party split from the vu because it supported the independence of Flan-
ders. From the 1980s onwards, the party politicized immigration and organized 
a conference dedicated to the ‘problem of foreigners’ in 1984. The vb defended 
27 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra, at 550.
28 W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, supra.
29 Ibid., at 277.
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the ethnic homogeneity of Flanders, and its leader, Karel Dillen, proposed a bill 
to the Belgian Chamber of Representatives to fund the return of immigrants to 
their home country.30 The politicization of immigration helped the vb receive 
greater electoral support. After the party’s success in the 1988 Antwerp council 
elections, the other parties decided to agree never to form a coalition with the 
vb on any matters relating to jurisdiction (i.e. the famous cordon sanitaire). 
This measure is efficient because, without the ability to form coalitions, the 
party had no chance of forming a government under the proportional election 
system. In 1991, the party received more than 10% of the votes in Flanders and 
6.58% in Belgium, on a day that would be remembered as Black Sunday. The 
point here is that the vb defended the ethnic homogeneity of Flanders for the 
sake of nationalism and, in so doing, motivated the other nationalist-minded 
parties to agree never to form a coalition with them. In other words, despite 
their political divergences, the other parties were motivated to preserve the 
legitimacy of Flemish nationalism against possible charges of racism.
The second example concerns the introduction of the compulsory inbur-
gering courses, established in 2003.31 These courses were recommended by 
the leading Flemish liberal party and supported by its coalition partners, 
the Flemish socialists, the greens and the regionalists. The programme, as it 
still exists, suggests a three-step approach: (1) a Dutch-language programme, 
(2) social orientation (maatschappelijke oriëntatie) courses and (3) personal 
coaching for professional integration. In addition to its objective of providing 
immigrants with some level of knowledge concerning Belgian institutions, 
the second component of the programme specifically emphasizes the need 
for participants to learn ‘common Flemish social norms and values’.32 It is in-
teresting to note that these courses have a specific target group (focus groep): 
new migrants coming from non-European countries, and all Belgian adults of 
foreign origin who were born elsewhere with at least one parent who was not 
born in Belgium.33 The integration courses are obligatory for migrants arriving 
30 H. Coffé and J. Dewulf, “Wavering Between Radical and Moderate: The Discourse of the 
Vlaams Belang in Flanders (Belgium)” in M. Feldman and P. Jackson (eds.), Doublespeak: 
The Rhetoric of the Far Right since 1945 (Stuttgart, Ibidem Verlag, 2014), at 150.
31 There is no word in English that would correspond to the meaning of the Dutch term 
‘inburgering’. The word could be tentatively translated as a process of ‘citizenization’, in 
which immigrants participate in integration courses and are subsequently transformed 
into citizens.
32 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra, at 557.
33 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ecri), Report on Belgium, 2014 
accessed March 20, 2015, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country 
-by-country/belgium/BEL-CbC-V-2014-001-ENG.pdf, at 28.
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in Flanders, but optional for those arriving in Brussels. Failure to comply can 
result in a significant “[…]administrative fine between €50 and €5000, or it 
might lead to the withdrawal of certain benefits for people who are dependent 
on social assistance, in addition to posing an obstacle to social housing”.34
There is reason to argue that the dilemma of sub-state nationalism, as formu-
lated by Kymlicka, has been discredited.35 At least two ssns are not exclusion-
ist towards immigrants, as the dilemma suggests. The Scottish case contradicts 
the dilemma, as Scotland perceives its immigration and integration policies 
as inclusive. In addition to lacking a radical nationalist party (in contrast to 
the Flemish case), the institutions of Scotland openly aim to form an inclusive 
multicultural society.36 The case of the Basque Country reflects a similar ap-
proach and manner of self-perception. Beginning in 2004, the Basque Country 
established a citizenship separate from the Spanish state, based on residence, 
which provided illegal immigrants with the opportunity to become Basque 
citizens.37 Moreover, even though the Basque Country promotes the official 
Basque language (Euskara) for pupils of migrant background, many multicul-
tural policies accompanying public education are aimed at recognizing and 
including different cultures. For example, schools in the Basque Country have 
multi-lingual welcome signs, and correspondence between the school and 
parents takes place in multiple languages.38 These examples demonstrate the 
empirical flaws of the dilemma of sub-state nationalism.39
The aforementioned shortcomings are due to a deficiency in Kymlicka’s 
conceptualization of the dilemma of sub-state nationalism. In designating 
immigration as a negative fact in and of itself, Kymlicka overlooks the possi-
bility that it can become a subject of ʻfederal competitionʼ amongst ssns. In 
34 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ecri), Report on Belgium, supra, 
at 28.
35 F. Barker, “Learning to be a Majority: Negotiating Immigration, Integration and National 
Membership in Québec”, (2010) 62(1) Political Science; Jeram, S., “Immigrants and the 
Basque Nation: Diversity as a New Marker of Identity”, (2013) 36(11) Ethnic and Racial 
Studies; Hepburn, E., “Citizens of the Region: Party Conceptions of Regional Citizenship 
and Immigrant Integration”, (2011) 50(4) European Journal of Political Research.
36 E. Hepburn and M. Rosie, “Immigration, Nationalism and Political Parties in Scotland” in 
Hepburn, E. and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds.) The Politics of Immigration in Multilevel States: 
Governance and Political Parties (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
37 S. Jeram and I. Adam, “Diversity and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Flanders: 
Understanding Immigrants as Fellow Minorities”, (2014) 17(3) National Identities, at 7.
38 Ibid., at 8.
39 M. Keating, Nations Against the State. The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia 
and Scotland (London, Macmillan, 1996).
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other words, when customized according to the needs of the ssn, immigration 
might help its demographics within a federal setting, while contributing to its 
economic development by receiving highly-skilled immigrants.40 Earlier in 
this chapter, in the discussion of the Flemish movement, I touched upon how 
cultural needs could become entangled with economic disparities. Kymlicka 
acknowledges this entanglement when arguing the inevitability of some illib-
eral integration policies: “Studies suggest that immigrants will only learn the 
majority language if it is seen as a ‘prestige’ language, as the language of eco-
nomic success, political advancement or high culture.”41 Nevertheless, he over-
looks the significant role that this aspect plays in formulating the dilemma.
In the Belgian case, the two widespread official languages (i.e. French and 
Dutch) are formally on an equal footing within the borders of the country. With 
regard to the issue of prestige, however, it depends primarily upon the interna-
tional prestige of the language. For example, French is one of the most widely 
spoken languages in the world, and it continues to perform the function of lin-
gua franca. In contrast, Dutch is a ‘rare’ language, which is spoken in Flanders, 
in the Netherlands and in the South African Republic. Given that immigrants 
from many African and Middle Eastern countries do speak French, while not 
knowing any Dutch when they arrive in Belgium, active policies are required 
in Flanders in order to compensate for this international gap at the national 
level. Furthermore, Flanders receives more third-country nationals than does 
Wallonia, which receives migrants of predominantly European origin.
When adjusted according to the competitive element, the dilemma of sub-
state nationalism can be very useful in explaining the approach to immigration 
and immigrant integration adopted by the Flemish separatist party N-VA. As 
explained earlier in this chapter, other political parties opposed the vb’s ap-
proach to defining Flemish society as based on ethnicity, seeking to respond 
to the challenge of external legitimacy, which is endemic to the dilemma of 
sub-state nationalism. This generated an incentive for the N-VA to shape its 
approach according to these political and normative limitations, meaning that 
the party would need to fashion its own policies, in stark contrast to the vb. 
In this effort, the N-VA emphasized two elements: (1) its inclusionist approach 
to immigrants and (2) the importance of civic integration. The approach that 
the N-VA adopted with regard to immigration and integration is developed in 
40 I. Adam and K. Deschouwer, “Nationalist Parties and Immigration in Flanders: From Volk-
sunie to Spirit and N-VA”, (2015) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, at 1; S. Jeram, 
A. Van der Zwet and V. Wisthaler, “Friends or Foes? Migrants and Sub-state Nationalists in 
Europe”, supra, at 5.
41 W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, supra, at 286.
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detail in the final section of this chapter. At this point, however, it is important 
to provide a brief explanation of these two elements.
By presenting its approach to immigration, the N-VA stresses that, unlike 
the vb, the problem is not inherent in ‘foreigners’ or ‘immigrants’, but in the 
established immigration policies. In this way, the party targets the liberal poli-
cies of citizenship rather than the presence of immigrants. In other words, the 
N-VA emphasizes its inclusive approach to immigrants. In so doing, it distin-
guishes itself by avoiding the concept of assimilation, which the vb employed 
after having been condemned by the court, and speaking instead in terms of 
integration. The party regards integration as a civic concept, placing specific 
emphasis on learning the Flemish language and using it in the public sphere, 
thus distancing itself from the vb’s ethnic understanding of citizenship.
As used in the preceding discussion of immigration policies, the terms ‘in-
clusionist’ and ‘exclusionist’ are merely relative and comparative. It is clear 
that the policies favoured by the N-VA are more inclusive policies than are 
those of the vb. It would be odd, however, to think that such relative inclusive-
ness would be sufficient to qualify the N-VA’s approach as inclusive of immi-
grants. This is especially true, considering that the standpoint of the vb simply 
does not constitute a normatively defensible position. It would make sense 
to engage in such a comparative enterprise if we were to have a normatively 
defensible standpoint consistent with liberal democratic principles. The next 
step in the analysis involves elaborating such a framework for the integration 
of immigrants.
 Normative Limits of Integration Policies for Sub-State Nations
In this section, I reflect on a normative reference point for the just accommo-
dation of immigrants in holding-together sub-state nations. I outline a norma-
tive concept of integration that is respectful of liberal democratic principles. 
This path was opened by Kymlicka in the development of the dilemma of sub-
state nationalism. This dilemma raises the question of “Which sorts of accom-
modations or settlements amongst immigrants and national minorities are 
most consistent with liberal-democratic norms of justice and freedom […]”?42 
I argue that Kymlicka’s answer does not provide the tools necessary for distin-
guishing integration from assimilation. This is the purpose of this section.
Kymlicka’s normative conclusion to the dilemma of sub-state national-
ism results in the distinction of ‘ethnic’ forms of sub-state nationalism from 
42 W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, supra, at 277.
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 ‘post-ethnic’ forms, arguing that only the latter comply with liberal norms. 
Kymlicka also argues, however, that “[…] special policies may be needed to 
encourage or pressure immigrants to integrate into the majority’s culture”.43 
Moreover, in reflecting on the normative claims of sub-states, he argues that 
“[…] such illiberal policies may be required if national minorities are to suc-
cessfully integrate immigrants”.44 Some of these measures could include 
the  obligation to educate children in the minority language rather than in 
the majority language, or the obligation for shop names to be rendered in the 
minority language. Such illiberal measures are more likely to be adopted in 
nations in which the national language is not widely spoken, and in which 
it has become a symbol of the community’s distinctness from the other na-
tional minorities (as is the case in Québec, Flanders, the Basque Country and 
Catalonia). In short, Kymlicka’s account remains limited: in permitting some 
illiberal measures, it fails to set a clear normative line between the integration 
and assimilation of immigrants. According to Kymlicka, assimilation is unjust, 
although it is unclear whether it is unjust to require the assimilation of immi-
grants situated in ssns.
At this stage, it is important to clarify what is wrong with assimilation or, 
more precisely, what distinguishes assimilation from integration. Kymlicka de-
fends cultural rights because of their inalienable character for the liberal ideal 
of individual autonomy. Individuals are able to act autonomously by virtue of 
their cultural identities. A significant threat to these identities is harmful to 
individual autonomy. This, in turn, would constitute an important breach of 
liberal democratic principles. The relevant point is that culture is what pro-
vides people with the range of options (i.e. ‘context of choice’ from which they 
can autonomously choose and shape their particular life plans, even as the 
ways in which they evaluate the various available options are largely limited by 
culture.45 As a policy implication, states should respect cultural identities in 
order to respect the autonomy of their citizens. This in turn requires processes 
of federalization in the case of national minorities, and multiculturalist poli-
cies in the case of migrant groups. These two groups are thus ‘in the same boat’ 
with regard to the nation-state, claiming some space in order to preserve their 
own distinct cultures, and thus their autonomy. Assimilation occurs when im-
migrant groups do not receive autonomous space and are thus compelled to 
replace their cultural affiliations with those of the ssn.
43 Ibid., at 286.
44 Ibid., at 281.
45 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), 
at 165.
 Please check the unmatched parenthesis in the sentence “i.e. ‘context of choice’…”
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We must then ask, how integration should be understood. It is helpful to 
disqualify two options as morally problematic for understanding integration: 
(1) segregation and (2) complete assimilation. Segregation refers to a situation 
in which migrants live in complete isolation from the receiving society, remain-
ing unaware of its norms and unable to understand what is socially and politi-
cally happening around them. Such situations often result in the ghetto-ization 
of migrants, relegating them to unfavourable neighbourhoods and low-paid 
jobs. This eventually has a negative impact on the well-being of subsequent 
generations, as well as on the receiving society. In the scenario of complete as-
similation, migrants are expected to become indistinguishable from natives:
[…] spatially intermixed in their homes and workplaces, socially inter-
twined through marriages and friendships, culturally alike in their be-
liefs, behaviours, and ways of life, and comparably placed in the kinds of 
work that they do and in the patterns of their educational and economic 
achievement.46
Many would agree that the first scenario is morally implausible, whereas the 
second might appear to less problematic to some. Assimilation might appear 
conducive to economic equality, and thus morally unproblematic. Neverthe-
less, two problems are inherent in assimilation. First, it returns us to the point 
at which the normative analysis began: the importance of cultural identity to 
individual autonomy. One reason that it is important to subject the concept 
of integration to normative scrutiny has to do with its relationship to the au-
tonomy of immigrants. Assimilation harms the autonomy of immigrants by 
forcing them to abandon their cultural roots in order to absorb the culture of 
the receiving society. More importantly, I argue that assimilationist policies 
imply pseudo-inclusion, but are in fact exclusionary. Assimilationist policies 
appear to send the message that physical qualities (e.g. ethnicity and race) do 
not matter: ‘You are welcome to the extent that you publicly behave like one 
of us.’ The exclusionary nature of the message becomes clear when it is refor-
mulated in the converse: ‘You are not welcome the way you are.’ This pseudo-
inclusionary appearance performs two functions, as it helps the proponent to 
avoid the potential criticism of racism, while hiding its exclusionary nature 
towards the moral personalities of individuals. The proponent paradoxically 
thinks that ethnic origin does not matter, while the requirements of civic in-
tegration are defined exclusively according to the values of the receiving so-
ciety. This implies that immigrants have no moral or political autonomy for 
46 J.H. Carens, “The Integration of Immigrants”, (2005) 2(1) Journal of Moral Philosophy, at 42.
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contributing to the formulation of civic integration in the receiving society. 
Their physical bodies are thus welcome, although their moral and political 
personalities are not. Unfortunately, the artificial distinction that the propo-
nent makes between the physical and moral personality of people is violent, 
in that human beings are formed only through the combination of these two 
aspects. The moral component of the personality is what makes the person an 
end in itself. In this sense, distinguishing the moral and physical personalities 
corresponds to a breach of the second formulation of categorical imperative, 
as specified by Kant: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end 
and never simply as a means.”47
We disqualify segregation and absolute assimilation as the limits of the nor-
mative concept of integration. It is safe to think that integration is situated be-
tween these two scenarios, although it is not clear exactly where. Perhaps shar-
ing a common identity could form such a middle ground. Liberal nationalism 
affirms this, holding that it is essential for the members of a society to share 
a common identity.48 This is because a common identity can be reformulated 
over time through the participation of migrants and natives, thereby avoid-
ing assimilation. According to liberal nationalism, however, ruptures in com-
mon identity are to be avoided at all costs.49 As plausible as it might sound, 
immigrant cultures are almost always destined to be in a minority position 
because of their limited demographic weight and potential for political influ-
ence. Taking this into consideration reveals how, even despite the theoretical 
possibility that migrants could contribute to the reformulation of the common 
identity,50 to do so would ultimately amount to their assimilation.51 The main 
reason is that the political institutions of the receiving country that are already 
in place reflect the native culture to a significant extent. This gives national 
cultures an important advantage over migrant cultures. More specifically, as-
similationist tendencies become more visible in integration programmes that 
take the common identity as a short-term objective. They become particularly 
problematic when such programmes are formulated as requirements that are 
47 I. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (3d ed) J. Ellington (trans) (Hackett, [1785] 
1993), at 30.
48 D. Miller, On Nationality, supra; M. Canovan, “Patriotism Is Not Enough”, (2000) 30 British 
Journal of Political Science, at 413–432; Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1993).
49 D. Miller, On Nationality, supra, at. 128–129.
50 H. De Schutter, “European Ties that Bind: Political or Cultural?” in E. Cloots, G. De Baere 
and S. Sottiaux (eds.), Federalism in the European Union (Oxford, Hart, 2012), at 171.
51 D. Miller, On Nationality, supra, at 72.
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legally enforced or upon which certain welfare-state services are made condi-
tional. In this sense, striving for a common identity in the short term is unjus-
tified, although such a pursuit would be fair as a longer-term expectation or 
aspiration.52
Many states define integration as a two-way process of ‘give and take’ be-
tween the receiving society and immigrants.53 In my view, this process could 
be considered to involve active and passive components for each group. What 
they learn from the other group has an epistemic value, corresponding to the 
passive role of a simple ‘listener’. When they communicate their own views, 
they are playing the active role of a ‘speaker.’ It is evident that immigrants must 
adjust to the receiving society and its particular way of organizing its social 
and political life. In this sense, immigrants – specifically the first  generation – 
must engage in considerable listening and learning, in addition to making 
adjustments in order to function well in the receiving society. They acquire 
generic competences, including learning the public language and obtaining 
the bureaucratic and institutional knowledge that they need in order to find 
their way in the new society. These passive competences are important, how-
ever, as they ultimately permit immigrants to make active contributions to the 
receiving society. Passive competences are valuable only to the extent that they 
enable immigrants to become active members. In other words, passive com-
ponents are instrumentally valuable, whereas active components are intrin-
sically valuable. The active component refers to their economic, cultural and 
political contributions to the receiving society’s organization.
The political contributions are often misunderstood, as they are some-
times addressed against some of the receiving society’s norms and values.54 
They therefore call for deeper discussion. The political contributions made by 
immigrants tend to appear as a sign of the group’s lack of integration.55 This 
is misleading, given that immigrant political interest is a sign of integration. 
52 J.H. Carens, “The Integration of Immigrants”, supra, at 30–31.
53 The Common Basic Principles of Immigrants Integration is a central document of the 
‘eu Framework on Integration’, which functions as a ‘soft-law’ document guiding the 
policies of member states. The first article defines integration as a dynamic, two-way pro-
cess of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. See 
in Council of the eu 2004 14615/04 (Presse321) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf, at 17.
54 M. Gianni, “Citoyenneteté et Intégration des Musulmans en Suisse: Adaptation aux 
Normes ou Participation à leur Définition?” in Schneuwly, M. Gianni and M. Jenny (eds.) 
Musulmans d’Aujourd’hui: Identités Plurielles en Suisse M. (Genève, Labor et Fides, 2009).
55 I am grateful to Matteo Gianni for stressing the importance of the relationship between 
‘caring’ and raising a ‘challenging claim’.
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If the political interest of immigrants is sometimes expressed in the form of 
raising claims and concerns, it is ultimately because they care about how that 
particular society is organized. Without this aspect of care, immigrants would 
be alienated from the society and would not perceive a reason to make any 
effort to challenge it. They might contribute to the organization of the soci-
ety by requesting some group-differentiated rights. Examples might include 
native-language education for their children in public schools; the recognition 
of some of their religious or national holidays as work-free days for them; op-
tions for dietary exceptions where they work or live; recognition of their ethnic 
or religious associations and cooperation of the state authorities with them on 
relevant issues. When met, all of these concrete demands draw a line between 
integration and assimilation, and they should thus be respected if the receiv-
ing state wishes to offer immigrants fair terms for integration. Fair terms for 
integration constitute a normative reference point upon which to evaluate the 
approaches that the Flemish separatist parties adopted towards the issues re-
lated to immigration. It is nevertheless important to explain exactly what the 
normative distinction between assimilation and integration implies for public 
integration policies.
The literature on public integration policies contains a categorization along 
two dimensions.56 These categorizations represent concrete standards for 
evaluating the standpoints of the separatist parties, which are considered in 
the next section. The first dimension concerns the ‘target audience’ of integra-
tion policies (i.e. the group to whom they are addressed). The policies are cul-
turally blind when they address the entire population and multi-cultural when 
they address particular ethno-cultural groups. The second dimension concerns 
how much initiative a state takes in terms of integration. We can define two 
extremes for this dimension: laissez-faire integration policies, which imply no 
intervention in this domain, and interventionist policies. An integration policy 
can result in assimilation in two different manners: (1) by presenting itself as 
culturally-blind or (2) by legally enforcing the common identity of the receiv-
ing state on the immigrants in the short term, making some state services con-
tingent upon the requirements of integration.
The three criteria summarizing the public policy recommendations to im-
plement fair integration policies are as follows:
1. A multicultural integration model rather than a difference-blind assimila-
tion model: The normative concept of integration is that the ssn should es-
tablish a multiculturalist integration policy rather than a  difference-blind 
56 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra.
0002727378.INDD   104 4/20/2016   8:55:02 PM
105Flemish Pro-independence Parties and Immigrants
301935
one. The former grants public recognition to cultural, linguistic and reli-
gious differences, whereas the latter has a universalist concept of equal 
citizenship within a ‘neutral’ liberal state. A well-developed point in the 
literature, the impossibility of neutrality on the part of the state amounts 
to the argument that the state is shaped by the culture of the society, 
from the selection of public holidays to the designation of public lan-
guage. As stated by Kymlicka: “In the areas of official languages, political 
boundaries, and the division of powers, there is no way to avoid this or 
that societal culture.”57
2. Interventionism is necessary in order to provide immigrants with generic 
competences:
(a) The state should not take a hands-off approach with regard to the 
integration of immigrants; it should provide opportunities to fa-
cilitate such integration. This applies specifically to a context in 
which the public language of the ssn is rare, as opposed to being a 
mainstream lingua franca (e.g. English, French or Spanish). In terms 
of language competence, the state should provide reasonable op-
tions for immigrants to learn the language in a flexible manner (e.g. 
through evening or weekend courses, possibly with provisions for 
partial funding).
(b) While being interventionist, the state should not aim at the assimi-
lation of immigrants. The proper kind of interventionism implies 
that legal requirements should be reduced. More specifically, state 
services should not be made conditional upon the requirements of 
integration. Rendering them conditional might prove necessary if 
it is observed that immigrants are wasting the opportunities. In the 
absence of observable abuse, however, direct conditionality would 
be unfair, in that it would assume immigrants to be abusive before 
providing them with the opportunity to behave otherwise.
3. Immigrant political participation should be supported: This criterion, 
which regulates the active contribution of immigrants, is the most im-
portant criterion for integration policies. Examples of such support in-
clude the facilitation of voting rights for immigrants, the facilitation of 
their rights to be elected, the provision of state funding for immigrant 
organizations and the employment of immigrants in the state’s social 
services.
57 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995), at 13.
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minorities share common languages) have an effect on the integration policies 
within the federation.63 The influence that these countries have on the ssns 
is not sufficient to argue the existence of a common Belgian philosophy of in-
tegration. Scholars have emphasized the lack of coordination and cooperation 
between the ssns in this area.64 The non-hierarchical nature of the distinct 
levels of government in Belgium is such that each level has an exclusive execu-
tive and legislative power on the assigned competences.65
Two distinct public philosophies of integration exist in Belgium.66 Flem-
ish integration policies are characterized by a multiculturalist, centralized and 
interventionist approach, whereas Francophone policies are difference-blind, 
localized and non-interventionist in nature. In Flanders, the general attitude 
calls for addressing the ethno-cultural groups when speaking of integration.67 
Cultural, religious and linguistic diversity is central to the approach taken to is-
sues relating to migration. In the Francophone part of the country, migration-
related issues are discussed in relation to economic equality and the inclusion 
of immigrants, but not with reference to ethno-cultural differences.68 From 
the Francophone perspective, therefore, even gathering data on ethnic com-
munities is seen as relatively discriminatory. In contrast, the Flemish Govern-
ment’s recent policy bill (beleidsnota) identifies “the systematic collection of 
data on immigrants” as one of the primary aims of state services.69 The reason 
is that such data eventually make it possible to evaluate, design and monitor 
63 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra; F. Barker, Nation-
alism, Identity and the Governance of Diversity: Old Politics, New Arrivals (London and New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); G. Vangoidsenhoven and J.-B. Pilet, “The Politicization of 
Immigration in Ireland” in W. van der Brug, G. D’Amato, D. Ruedin and J. Berkhout (eds.), 
The Politicisation of Migration (London, Routledge, 2015).
64 M. Martiniello, “Belgium” in C. Joppke and L. Seidle (eds.), Immigrant Integration in Fed-
eral Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), at 68.
65 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra, at 558; F. Barker, 
Nationalism, Identity and the Governance of Diversity: Old Politics, New Arrivals, supra, 
at 88.
66 The two communities have different patterns of immigration, which could also contrib-
ute to this difference. As Barker explains, “… Wallonia’s immigrant population is predomi-
nantly European, whereas Brussels and Flanders house larger shares of Belgium’s non-eu 
foreigners”. in F. Barker, Nationalism, Identity and the Governance of Diversity, supra, at 86.
67 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra; G. Vangoidsen-
hoven and J.-B. Pilet, “The Politicization of Immigration in Ireland”, supra.
68 I. Adam, “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions”, supra, at 555.
69 L. Homans, Beleidsnota Integratie en Inburgering (2014), accessed March 15, 2015, available 
at https://www.vlaanderen.be/nl/publicaties/detail/beleidsnota-2014-2019-integratie-en 
-inburgering, at 19.
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state policies. According to the Flemish perspective, by ignoring the present 
level of cultural diversity, the Francophone community provides evidence of 
an implicit assimilationist tendency, marked by the French republican tradi-
tion. Unlike the French-speaking community, Flemings have been eager to rec-
ognize and support immigrant organizations (zelforganisaties). Another differ-
ence has to do with the implementation of integration policies. A centralized 
Flemish policy makes integration courses obligatory in Flanders and optional 
in the Brussels Capital region. In contrast, the integration policies existing in 
Wallonia consist of differentiated local initiatives within the seven districts.
 Flemish Separatist Stance concerning Immigration and Citizenship
In this section, I explain how two separatist parties in Flanders approach the 
subject of immigration and integration. The two parties converge in that they 
both promote restrictive immigration policies. The distinction lies in the fact 
that the N-VA does not consider immigration to be bad in and of itself and that 
it presents itself as inclusive of immigrants, while the vb promotes an eth-
nically based understanding of citizenship. The moderate nationalist N-VA 
favours the ‘civic’ integration of immigrants, with an emphasis on linguistic 
skills. The radical nationalist vb aims to limiting immigration, and it promotes 
assimilation.
Given that the radical-nationalist anti-establishment party vb has been the 
subject of many studies, I provide only a brief explanation of their position, 
emphasizing their influence on the politicization of immigration. In Kym-
licka’s terms, the vb promotes ‘an ethnic understanding’ of citizenship. With 
its electoral success in 1991, which continued to increase until 2004, this party 
has been responsible for the politicization of immigration in Flanders, even 
though it has never been able to take part in government, due to the cordon 
sanitaire. The party has defended an anti-immigration position, beginning 
with its 70-point programme based on the principle of ‘our own people first’ 
(Eigen volk eerst). It has been argued that the party’s electoral success also al-
lowed it to set the agenda for the other political parties, which had not previ-
ously politicized the issue of immigration.70 The vb pursued several strategies 
of radicalization and moderation.71 After having been judged as promoting 
70 R. Dandoy, “Regionalist Parties and Immigration in Belgium” in E. Hepburn and R. 
 Zapata-Barrero (eds.), The Politics of Immigration in Multi-Level States (Basingstoke, 
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), at 205.
71 H. Coffé and J. Dewulf, “Wavering Between Radical and Moderate: The Discourse of the 
Vlaams Belang in Flanders (Belgium)” in M. Feldman and P. Jackson (eds.), Doublespeak: 
The Rhetoric of the Far Right since 1945 (Stuttgart, Ibidem Verlag, 2014).
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‘racism’ in its previous programme, it transformed its approach in favour of 
assimilationist policies. After 2004, it increasingly lost its support to the new 
nationalist party N-VA.
The conservative N-VA, alongside the progressive Spirit, is one of the succes-
sors of the vu, and it has gained increasing electoral support since 2007. Like 
the vb, the party advocates strict immigration and integration policies, albeit 
with more moderation. In this discussion, I present the N-VA’s understanding 
of integration and citizenship with reference to three important documents: 
(1) the complete vision statement of the N-VA on immigration (“Migration: 
A Challenge” [Migratie een Uitdaging];72 (2) the current policy bill of the Vice-
MP Homans and (3) the debate on national identity between the party leader 
Bart De Wever and the leader of the liberal party Open vld, Guy Verhofstadt.
The N-VA vision statement summarizes the general vision of the N-VA on 
migration-related issues. The primary argument is that migration, when regu-
lated effectively, can and should become a ‘positive story’, despite the current 
negative experiences of Flemings.73 These negative experiences are related to 
the perception of immigrants as beneficiaries of citizenship and the welfare-
state services associated with it, without any precondition of integration. In 
such a picture, immigrants are often represented as having a higher unem-
ployment rate. A positive story can be generated by portraying immigrants 
as active economic contributors: “Fortunately enough, we can very much use 
[emphasis added] active people, who are able to integrate into the society 
quickly.”74 Active immigration refers to two distinct categories: (1) labour mi-
gration and (2) student migration. While passive migration channels (e.g. fam-
ily reunification and asylum seekers) are discouraged, simplified procedures 
are established to reinforce active immigration.75 The N-VA opposes the lib-
eral nationality law, which has been referred to in derogatory terms as the 
‘Instant-Belgian Act’ (snel-Belg wet), was introduced by the coalition led by 
the Open vld. The N-VA also opposes the mass amnesty regularizations in-
troduced in the 2000s under the leadership of Guy Verhofstadt. According to 
the N-VA view, immigrants should receive citizenship only when they are able 
to demonstrate their integration, have a clean criminal record and are active 
72 N-VA, N-VA’s Vision of Immigration and Integration, accessed April 20, 2015, available at 
http://www.n-va.be/sites/default/files/generated/files/brochure-attachment/brochure 
_asiel_en_migratie.pdf.
73 N-VA, N-VA’s Vision of Immigration and Integration, supra, at 5.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., at 21.
 Please check the unmatched parenthesis in the sentence ““Migration: A Challenge”…”
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economic contributors to the society.76 In turn, immigrants demonstrate their 
integration through linguistic competence in Dutch and the willingness to 
embrace Flemish values.77
The policy bill prepared by Liesbeth Homans (the current N-VA Vice-MP 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Integration, Housing, Equal Opportunities 
and Poverty Reduction) not only details the N-VA’s views, but also clarifies 
how the integration policies are to develop in the short term in Flanders.78 At 
first glance, employment appears to be ‘the most important’ denominator of 
integration;79 the emphasis on the Dutch language is remarkable80 and lan-
guage is correlated with economic inequality. Moreover, it is the Dutch lan-
guage that marks the divide between the public and private spheres: “Which-
ever language that someone speaks at home, the public language that binds 
us together that we all (have to) speak is Dutch.”81 The document explains two 
changes in Flemish integration policies for the period 2014–2019: (1) the de-
mands of the policy have been deepened and (2) the sphere of application 
has been broadened, both geographically and in relation to groups. Instead 
of defining integration as an ‘obligation to make an effort’ (inspanningsverpli-
chting), the demand to integrate has been deepened to include ‘the engage-
ment of result’ (resultaatverbintenis).82 More specifically, the Dutch linguistic 
competence requirement has been raised from the A1 level to the A2 level. In 
practice, however, this requirement reflects an increase of two levels instead 
of one. In the past, immigrants were obliged to attend the A1 level courses, 
but they were not required to pass the level. Under the current policy, they 
must pass the first two levels. The geographic enlargement was intended to 
extend the obligatory integration courses to the Brussels-Capital region, while 
the group-related enlargement was intended to include other groups (e.g. la-
bour migrants and eu citizens) in the target group (focusgroep).83 The societal 
togetherness that unites autochthonous and ‘new’ Flemings is grounded on 
76 Ibid., at 31.
77 Ibid.
78 L. Homans, Beleidsnota Integratie en Inburgering, supra.
79 Ibid., at 11.
80 The word Dutch (Nederlands) appears 77 times, and the word language (taal) appears 84 
times throughout the document written by Homans. The document also includes com-
posite words (e.g. language of culture [cultuurtaal] and linguistic policy (taalbeleid).
81 L. Homans, Beleidsnota Integratie en Inburgering, supra., at 21.
82 Flemish Government, Government Agreement 2014–2019, accessed 4 April, 2015, available 
at http://www4wvg.vlaanderen.be/wvg/armoede/publicaties/Documents/regeerakkoord 
_Vlaamse_Regering_2014-19.pdf, at 13.
83 Ibid., at 130.
 Please check the unmatched parenthesis in the sentence “e.g. language…”
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the norms and values proper to the Flemish society, while respecting everyone’s 
differences.84
The debate between the N-VA leader Bart De Wever and the former presi-
dent of the Open vld Guy Verhofstadt concerning the ‘Flemish national iden-
tity’ is relevant in this regard. This political debate is similar to the academic 
debate on the nature of national identity based on two competing approaches 
to social cohesion: civic patriotism (post-nationalism), represented by Ver-
hofstadt, and nationalism, represented by De Wever (albeit with conservative 
leanings). The debate crystallized in 2010, after Verhofstadt had published an 
article in the French daily Le Monde criticizing the debate on national identity 
in France.85 Verhofstadt states that the idea of a shared future is sufficient to 
unify both migrants and natives, claiming that past heritage cannot fulfil this 
function, as nationalists would argue. In other words, it is by overcoming the 
traditional nationalist values that the civic values of equality, justice and de-
mocracy can prevail. Verhofstadt’s ideas are in line with post-nationalism, an 
approach in contemporary normative political philosophy, famously defended 
by Jürgen Habermas. Addressing global problems calls for establishing such a 
political union rather than a nationalist cultural union. In this regard, Verhof-
stadt follows Habermas in defending a post-national constellation.86 Assum-
ing that contemporary developments are irreversible, and in order to attenuate 
the undesired effects of globalization, a central place must be restored to the 
political realm, and this calls for a different method of organization.87 More-
over, Verhofstadt considers debates surrounding ‘national identities’ danger-
ous in the sense that they lead “to xenophobia and racism”.88 Sven Gatz, an 
Open vld politician and the current mp in Flemish Parliament for Culture, 
Media, Youth and Brussels, refines Verhofstadt’s position, explaining that the 
actual aim is not to stigmatize identity, but rather to highlight the difficulty of 
imposing a collective identity on an immigration society.89 For De Wever, given 
84 L. Homans, Beleidsnota Integratie en Inburgering, supra, at 17.
85 G. Verhofstadt, “Il y a quelque chose de pourrie en République Française”, Le Monde, 
February 11, 2010, accessed April 1, 2015, available at http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/arti 
cle/2010/02/11/il-y-a-quelque-chose-de-pourri-en-republique-francaise-par-guy-verhof 
stadt_1304295_3232.html.
86 J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, M. Persky (trans.) (Cam-
bridge, mit Press, 2001).
87 G. Verhofstadt, “Nationalisme is Gevaarlijk”, De Standaard, October 10, 2012, accessed 
15 April, 2015, available at http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20121009_00328613.
88 G. Verhofstadt, “Europa Zal Postnationaal Zijn of niet Zijn”, De Standaard, February 24, 
2014, accessed March 15, 2015, available at http://www.standaard.be/cnt/1b2ml8gn.
89 S. Gatz, “Kosmopolieten”, De Standaard, February 22, 2014, accessed March 5 2015, avail-
able at http://www.standaard.be/cnt/gd2mg0ck.
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the absence of a Belgian national identity, and given the need for a ‘healthy’ 
national identity, the Flemish identity is needed in order to fulfil this require-
ment. As argued by De Wever, “In order to choose fully for Flemish identity 
and give its political gestalt, active souls should be won.”90 In this argument, 
De Wever distinguishes between exclusive and inclusive forms of national iden-
tity. The former emphasizes the ethno-cultural elements, whereas the latter 
emphasizes civil and cultural elements (e.g. linguistic competence).91 In this 
sense, De Wever positions the N-VA between the radical-extremist vb (which 
De Wever qualifies as exhibiting an exclusive form of nationalism) and the 
post-nationalism of Verhofstadt. Such ‘inclusive nationalism’ is an important 
good to promote, argues De Wever, given its potential to function as a unifying 
power, offering a positive connotation to togetherness and belonging to the 
national community.
 Concluding Debate
This chapter examines the relationship between the sub-state separatist po-
litical parties and immigration policies in the Flemish case, with an emphasis 
on integration policies. Its objective is to answer the question of whether the 
standpoints of sub-state separatist parties have been exclusionist with regard 
to immigrants. Inclusion, exclusion, integration, assimilation and similar con-
cepts are morally grounded. This means that they must be justified according 
to liberal democratic principles if their aim is to evaluate the standpoint of a 
political party (as in the Belgian case). To this end, the chapter combines nor-
mative and contextual analyses. The third step in the analysis specifically in-
volves the moral distinction between integration and assimilation, along with 
the concrete public policies implied by this distinction. The fourth step con-
cerns the standpoints of the separatist parties on immigration and integration. 
In this discussion, I use a debate between the public policy recommendations 
and the separatist standpoints to demonstrate that the approaches adopted 
by the sub-state separatist parties are exclusionary towards immigrants in the 
Flemish case.
The evaluation of the standpoint adopted by the radical-nationalist vb does 
not merit discussion, as it defends an ethnic understanding of citizenship. The 
90 B. De Wever,“Voluit Vlaamse Zieltjes Winnen”, De Standaard, October 7, 2011, accessed 
March 1, 2015, available at http://www.standaard.be/cnt/6e3givcv.
91 B. De Wever, “Gezonde Identiteit”, De Standaard, June 15, 2010, accessed April 5, 2015, avail-
able at http://www.standaard.be/cnt/2n2rha7n.
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case reveals a transition from a racist approach to an assimilationist approach 
following the party’s judicial condemnation of promoting racism. The case of 
the N-VA is more interesting in this respect, as this party’s standpoint is aimed 
at distinguishing the party from the vb, in order to legitimize its position.
The first criterion for evaluation concerns the type of integration policies 
pursued by the ssn. According to this criterion, the integration policies should 
not be difference-blind but multicultural, as difference-blind policies lead to 
assimilation. The N-VA ultimately succeeded in recognizing the ethnic, cul-
tural and religious diversity of the Flemish context, as well as the need to di-
rect some policies towards immigrants as beneficiaries. This approach differed 
from the Francophone public philosophy of integration, in which the concern 
for various identities was replaced by the concern for economic inequality.
The second criterion required the ssn integration policies to be interven-
tionist, in order to provide opportunities while respecting and recognizing dif-
ferent immigrant identities in the public sphere. This criterion questions the 
obligatory nature of integration policies as well as the requirement of appro-
priating Flemish norms, both of which are defended by the N-VA. Moreover, 
the N-VA argued that immigrants should be held responsible for completing 
the integration programmes successfully and that public services should be 
conditional upon this success. These aspects demonstrate how the N-VA, even 
though it regards its approach as inclusionist, it ultimately promotes assimila-
tion rather than integration. This is due to the emphasis on mono-national 
Flemish culture as the framework for the integration programmes, without 
allowing any fair space for the public recognition of differences. As justified 
in the third section, assimilationist policies imply pseudo-inclusion, although 
they are actually exclusionary towards immigrants. Insofar as the N-VA pro-
motes assimilationist policies under the label of integration, it has an exclu-
sionary attitude towards immigrants, despite the fact it presents its position 
publicly as inclusive. In this sense, the N-VA’s line of argument suffers from 
a deep logical inconsistency. Although the party qualifies its nationalism as 
inclusive, by confusing assimilation with integration, it exhibits exclusive in-
stead of inclusive nationalism.
The third criterion required active citizenship as an aim of integration. It 
is nevertheless impossible to reduce the active aspect of citizenship solely to 
economic contributions, as desired by the N-VA. By defining it as such, the 
N-VA aims to attract highly-skilled immigrants or students, demonstrating 
that these people can be useful to the society. Without any emphasis on other 
forms of participation, the presence of immigrants is justified in terms of its 
instrumental value to society. Moreover, the possibility that the brain gain 
inherent in the perspective of the N-VA might result in a brain-drain for the 
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sending state demonstrates that the normative concerns of the party are lim-
ited to Flanders.
Clarifying the normative limits of integration and definitively distinguish-
ing it from assimilation sets a higher normative threshold than does Kym-
licka’s distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘post-ethnic’ citizenship. This could 
be regarded as a sign of moral progress. It is now self-evident that an ‘eth-
nic’ form of citizenship is an indefensible practice, although this has not al-
ways been the case in the past. The general aim of distinguishing integration 
from assimilation was to clarify the moral harm done by assimilation and 
its incompatibility with liberal-democratic principles. With this analysis, this 
chapter demonstrates how normative/philosophical analysis is relevant to 
the understanding of contemporary political reality concerning immigration. 
More specifically, it establishes that sub-state separatism and immigration 
are incompatible in the Flemish case, allowing for a wider debate in future 
for other cases.
Bibliography
Adam, I., “Immigrant Integration Policies of the Belgian Regions: Sub-state Nation-
alism and Policy Divergence after Devolution”, (2013) 23(5) Regional and Federal 
Studies.
Adam, I., and Deschouwer, K., “Nationalist Parties and Immigration in Flanders: From 
Volksunie to Spirit and N-VA”, (2015) Journal of Ethnic and Migration.
Barker, F., “Learning to be a Majority: Negotiating Immigration, Integration and Na-
tional Membership in Québec”, (2010) 62(1) Political Science.
Barker, F., Nationalism, Identity and the Governance of Diversity: Old Politics, New Arriv-
als (London and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
Blommaert, J., “The Long Language-ideological Debate in Belgium”, (2011) 6(3) Journal 
of Multicultural Discourses.
Brubaker, R., Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, ma, Har-
vard University Press, 1992).
Buchanan, J., “Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitu-
tional Reform”, (1995) 25(2) Publius.
Canovan, M., “Patriotism Is Not Enough”, (2000) 30 British Journal of Political Science.
Carens, J.H., “The Integration of Immigrants” (2005) 2(1) Journal of Moral Philosophy, 
at 29–46.
Coffé, H., and J. Dewulf, “Wavering Between Radical and Moderate: The Discourse 
of the Vlaams Belang in Flanders (Belgium)” in M. Feldman and P. Jackson (eds.) 
Doublespeak: The Rhetoric of the Far Right since 1945 (Stuttgart, Ibidem Verlag, 2014).
0002727378.INDD   114 4/20/2016   8:55:02 PM
115Flemish Pro-independence Parties and Immigrants
301935
Council of the eu 2004 14615/04 (Presse321), accessed March 20, 2015, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745 
.pdf.
Dandoy, R., “Regionalist Parties and Immigration in Belgium” in E. Hepburn and R. 
Zapata-Barrero (eds.), The Politics of Immigration in Multi-Level States (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
Deschouwer, K., “The Rise and Fall of the Belgian Regionalist Parties”, (2009) 19(4–5) 
Regional and Federal Studies.
Deschouwer, K., and Van Parijs, P., “Electoral Engineering for a Stalled Federation. A 
Country-wide Electoral District for Belgium’s Federal Parliament” in B. O’Leary and 
J. McEvoy (eds.), Power-Sharing in Deeply Divided Places (Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
De Schutter, H., “European Ties that Bind: Political or Cultural?” in E. Cloots, G. de 
Baere and S. Sottiaux (eds.), Federalism in the European Union (Oxford, Hart, 2012).
European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ecri), Report on Belgium, 
2014 accessed March 20, 2015, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/
ecri/country-by-country/belgium/BEL-CbC-V-2014-001-ENG.pdf.
Favell, A., Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France 
and Britain (London Macmillan and New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
Favell, A., “Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe: A Review and Cri-
tique” in T. Alexander Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds.), Citizenship Today: Global 
Perspectives and Practices (Washington dc, Brookings Institution/Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 2001).
Flemish Government, “Government Agreement 2014–2019”, accessed 4 April, 2015, avail-
able at: http://www4wvg.vlaanderen.be/wvg/armoede/publicaties/Documents/ 
regeerakkoord_Vlaamse_Regering_2014-19.pdf.
Gagnon, A.-G., and Iacovino, R., Federalism, Citizenship, and Québec. Debating Multina-
tionalism (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2007).
Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism (2nd ed.) (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983).
Gianni, M., “Citoyenneteté et Intégration des Musulmans en Suisse: Adaptation aux 
Normes ou Participation à leur Définition?” in Schneuwly, M. Gianni and M. Jenny 
(eds.) Musulmans d’Aujourd’hui: Identités Plurielles en Suisse M. (Genève, Labor et 
Fides, 2009).
Habermas, J., The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, M. Persky (trans.) (Cam-
bridge, mit Press, 2001).
Hepburn, E., “Citizens of the Region: Party Conceptions of Regional Citizenship and 
Immigrant Integration”, (2011) 50(4) European Journal of Political Research.
Hepburn, E., and M. Rosie, “Immigration, Nationalism and Political Parties in Scotland” 
in E. Hepburn and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds.), The Politics of Immigration in Multilevel 
States: Governance and Political Parties (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
0002727378.INDD   115 4/20/2016   8:55:02 PM
Baycan116
301935
Hepburn, E., and R. Zapata-Barrero, The Politics of Immigration in Multilevel States: 
Governance and Political Parties (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).
Hobsbawm, E.J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality (Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Homans, L., Beleidsnota Integratie en Inburgering (2014) accessed March 15, 2015, avail-
able at https://www.vlaanderen.be/nl/publicaties/detail/beleidsnota-2014-2019-int 
egratie-en-inburgering.
Jeram, S., “Immigrants and the Basque Nation: Diversity as a New Marker of Identity”, 
(2013) 36(11) Ethnic and Racial Studies.
Jeram, S. and Adam, I., “Diversity and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Flanders: 
Understanding Immigrants as fellow Minorities”, (2014) 17(3) National Identities.
Jeram, S., A. Van der Zwet and V. Wisthaler, “Friends or Foes? Migrants and Sub-state 
Nationalists in Europe”, (2015) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.
Joppke, C., “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in 
Western Europe”, (2007) 30(1) Western European Politics.
Joppke, C., and F.L. Seidle, Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (Montreal and 
London, Ithaca, 2012).
Kant, I., Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (3d ed) J. Ellington (trans) (Hackett, 
[1785] 1993).
Keating, M., Nations Against the State. The New Politics of Nationalism in Québec, Cata-
lonia and Scotland (London, Macmillan, 1996).
Koopmans, R., et al., Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Eu-
rope (Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
Kymlicka, W., Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1989).
Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 1995).
Kymlicka, W., Politics in the Vernacular (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).
Mahoney, J., The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Cen-
tral America (Baltimore, jhup, 2001).
Martiniello, M., “Belgium” in C. Joppke and L. Seidle (eds.), Immigrant Integration 
in Federal Countries (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2012).
Martiniello, M., “Immigrant Integration and Multiculturalism in Belgium” in R. Taras 
(ed.), Challenging Multiculturalism: European Models of Diversity (Edinburgh, Edin-
burgh University Press, 2013).
Miller, D., On Nationality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).
N-VA, “N-VA’s Vision of Immigration and Integration” accessed April 20, 2015, available 
at http://www.n-va.be/sites/default/files/generated/files/brochure-attachment/bro 
chure_asiel_en_migratie.pdf.
0002727378.INDD   116 4/20/2016   8:55:02 PM
117Flemish Pro-independence Parties and Immigrants
301935
N-VA Election Programme 2014, accessed April 21, 2015, available at https://www.n-va 
.be/sites/default/files/generated/files/brochure-attachment/verkiezingsprogram 
ma_n-va_2014.pdf.
Tamir, Y., Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993).
Vangoidsenhoven, G., and Pilet, J.-B., “The Politicization of Immigration in Ireland” in 
W. van der Brug, G. D’Amato, D. Ruedin and J. Berkhout (eds.), The Politicisation of 
Migration (London, Routledge, 2015).
0002727378.INDD   117 4/20/2016   8:55:02 PM
